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ABSTRACT
This paper concerns the design of mechanisms for online schedul-
ing in which agents bid for access to a re-usable resource such as
processor time or wireless network access. Each agent is assumed
to arrive and depart dynamically, and in the basic model require the
resource for one unit of time. We seek mechanisms that are truthful
in the sense that truthful revelation of arrival, departure and value
information is a dominant strategy, and that are online in the sense
that they make allocation decisions without knowledge of the fu-
ture. First, we provide two characterizations for the class of truth-
ful online allocation rules. The characterizations extend beyond
the typical single-parameter settings, and formalize the role of re-
stricted misreporting in reversing existing price-based characteriza-
tions. Second, we present an online auction for unit-length jobs that
achieves total value that is 2-competitive with the maximum ofﬂine
value. We prove that no truthful deterministic online mechanism
can achieve a better competitive ratio. Third, we consider revenue
competitiveness and prove that no deterministic truthful online auc-
tion has revenue that is constant-competitive with that of the ofﬂine
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism We provide a random-
ized online auction that achieves a competitive ratio of O(logh),
where h is the ratio of maximum value to minimum value among
the agents; this mechanism does not require prior knowledge of h.
Finally, we generalize our model to settings with multiple re-usable
goods and to agents with different job lengths.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
F.2 [Theory of Computation]: Analysis of Algorithms and Prob-
lem Complexity; J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behav-
ioral Sciences—Economics
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1.1 Motivation
Online mechanism design concerns the design of mechanisms for
markets in which agents arrive and depart over time, and the mecha-
nismmustcomputeallocationandpaymentdecisionsonlinewithout
knowledge of the agents who will subsequently arrive. Such prob-
lems arise in many practical applications of mechanism design (e.g.,
pricing access to a WiFi port at Starbucks [7], or scheduling com-
puter jobs on a shared server.) These problems are generally quite
difﬁcult because they combine the challenges of mechanism design
(i.e., ensuring truthfulness
1) with the challenges of designing on-
line algorithms (i.e., dealing with uncertainty about future inputs).
As an example, one of the most important techniques for designing
truthful mechanisms (the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) scheme) is
inapplicable in most online problems because it requires computing
an optimal allocation, which is generally impossible in the online
setting [7]. In this paper we will analyze truthful online mechanisms
in terms of their competitive ratio with the efﬁciency and revenue of
an (off-line) VCG scheme.
The setting we will consider is a simple scheduling problem, in
which agents bid for access to a re-usable resource over a sequence
of time slots. We will assume that the resource has a ﬁnite capacity,
most often 1. An agent has an arrival and departure time, and in
the basic model a value for receiving one unit of the resource dur-
ing this interval. Our objective is to design a mechanism for this
problem which is strategyproof with respect to not only the values,
but also the arrival and departure times. The requirement of strat-
egyproofness with respect to arrival and departure times makes the
online auction problem difﬁcult since it places constraints on the
timing of allocations. This is demonstrated by Lavi and Nisan [15],
who prove that without any restriction on the types of possible mis-
reports, it is impossible to achieve a bounded competitive ratio on
efﬁciency. In this paper, we study the problem with the assump-
tions of no early arrivals and no late departures, i.e., we assume
that agents cannot report an arrival time earlier than their true ar-
rival time or a departure time later than their true departure time.
This model was also adopted by Porter [20] for his work on online
auctions with re-usable goods.
The assumptions of no early arrival and no late departure are rea-
sonable in situations where it is possible to verify that agents are
physically present throughout their reported arrival-departure inter-
val (i.e., agents can hide their presence but not create a phantom
presence). Also, no early arrivals makes sense if one considers that
the arrival time is the ﬁrst time an agent learns about the auction.
No late departures makes sense, for example, in markets for a re-
source such as processor time where it is possible to delay granting
an agent the beneﬁt from using the resource (even though it is ready)
until departure, for instance by waiting until that time to report the
outcome of the processor’s computation.
2
Finally, it is worth mentioning that we consider the no early ar-
1We use truthfulness and strategyproofness interchangeably in this
paper.
2Porter [20] adopted this motivation in his work on online auctions
for processor scheduling.rivals assumption in this paper because it is quite natural and be-
cause the characterization of truthful mechanisms for this model is
simpler to state. However, almost all of our mechanisms remain
strategyproof without assuming no early arrivals.
1.2 Our contributions
In this paper, we give a characterization for the online alloca-
tion rules that are truthfully implementable. The characterization
is interesting because the online auction problem studied here is
neither single-parameter [1, 16], nor order-based [13], and a com-
plete characterization was previously not available for this model.
Furthermore, our result explicates the importance of limited mis-
reports in the design of truthful online auctions. We see this, for
instance, in the no early arrivals and no late departures assump-
tions. The characterization is stated in terms of monotonicity and
timing properties on allocation rules, but does not imply the W-
MON condition [13], which is known to be necessary for truthful
implementation in settings with unrestricted misreports. We are also
able to extend our characterization to address randomized mecha-
nisms. A parallel characterization is provided in terms of price-
basedauctions, thatdemonstratesthatwhilefullyagent-independent
prices are not necessary, prices must be value-independent and sat-
isfy monotonicity requirements with respect to report arrival and
departure times. Fully agent-independent prices are sufﬁcient for
truthfulness, but only necessary when there are unrestricted misre-
ports.
For unit-length jobs, we use the monotonicity characterization to
develop a truthful online auction that is 2-competitive with the op-
timal ofﬂine efﬁciency. The allocation problem is a special case of
the maximum-weight matching problem. Without the constraint of
truthfulness, the best known upper bounds on competitive ratio are
2 in the deterministic case and e/(e−1) in the randomized case [3,
10], while the best known lower bounds are 1.618 in the determin-
istic case and 1.25 in the randomized case [6, 8]. With the truth-
fulness constraint, we demonstrate that no deterministic mechanism
can obtain a better competitive ratio than 2, closing the gap. We
also extend the result to an asynchronous model in which time is a
continuous parameter, agents need not arrive and depart at integer
times, and jobs are interruptible, obtaining a 5-competitive mecha-
nism in this case. The auctions also extend to the case of k re-usable
goods available in each period, or equivalently a re-usable resource
with capacity k.
This simple 2-competitive online auction can have arbitrarily bad
revenue with respect to the ofﬂine VCG revenue. We prove that no
deterministic mechanism is constant-competitive with VCG for rev-
enue by giving a lower-bound of Ω

(logh/loglogh)
1/4

, where
h is the ratio of the maximum value to minimum value of agents.
Allowing for randomization in the mechanism, we can nearly match
this bound, obtaining a competitive ratio of O(logh) even without
knowledge of h.
Finally, we generalize our model to a setting with jobs with vary-
ing job length, introducing a fourth parameter to the private type
of an agent. Porter [20] had provided a deterministic auction that
satisﬁes an efﬁciency competitive ratio bound of (1 +
√
k)
2 + 1,
where k is the ratio of maximum to minimum value density (that
is, value divided by job length). We provide a randomized truthful
auction with a competitive ratio O(log(l)) where l is the ratio of
the maximum job length to the minimum job length of agents, as-
suming that upper and lower bounds on the job lengths are known
in advance to the mechanism designer. The auction is based on the
asynchronous unit-length auction. On the other hand, when the ratio
l is not known in advance we can achieve the same competitive ratio
with efﬁciency, using an online auction that is truthful with respect
to all parameters except job length.
1.3 Prior work
Online mechanism design has been the focus of several recent
papers. Many of these papers (e.g. [5, 11]) assume that the agents
arrive in a predetermined order which is not under their control,
and that an agent’s only private information is her value. Designing
truthful mechanisms is much easier in these single-parameter mod-
els. Some of the online mechanisms which have appeared (e.g. [2,
14]) are strategyproof against agents misstating their arrival or de-
parture time because they are based on prices which are monoton-
ically non-decreasing over time. However, such approaches do not
lead to competitive online mechanisms in our setting because the
non-decreasing price requirement is too restrictive.
Hajiaghayi, KleinbergandParkes[9]presentconstant-competitive
onlinemechanismsforauctioningidenticalgoods. Unlikethepresent
paper, they assume that the agents arrive in random order and study
a setting without re-usable goods in which goods can be allocated at
any particular time.
Friedman and Parkes [7] initiated the study of VCG-based online
mechanisms. Such mechanisms are (dominant-strategy) truthful in
the rare instances where the underlying allocation problem admits
an online algorithm with competitive ratio 1. Recently, Parkes and
Singh [18, 19] have studied VCG-based online mechanisms with
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, adopting the framework of Markov De-
cision Processes. The setting for this work is quite general, but the
solution concept is weaker than dominant strategy truthfulness.
Porter [20] presents a truthful mechanism for the variation on our
model with different length jobs. In order for an agent to derive
positive utility, it must be granted the resource for a total dura-
tion equal to its job length. Porter achieves a competitive ratio of
(1 +
√
k)
2 + 1 with respect to the optimal efﬁciency, where k is
the ratio of maximum to minimum value density (value divided by
processing time) of a job, and proves that this ratio is optimal for
deterministic mechanisms. Here, we provide a randomized mech-
anism whose efﬁciency competitive ratio is O(log(l)) where l is
the ratio of maximum to minimum processing time. This signiﬁ-
cantly improves Porter’s result, except for those instances in which
the amount of variation in job lengths is exponentially greater than
the variation in value densities.
Lavi and Nisan [15] study a closely-related online auction prob-
lem, in which items have expiration times and may be allocated any
time at or before their expiration. (Our model can be regarded as
a special case of theirs when the number of items is equal to the
number of time slots and items may only be allocated at their ex-
act expiration time.) Assuming unrestricted misreports, they prove
strong negative results for deterministic truthful auctions (no such
mechanism can achieve a competitive ratio better than the number
of items) and this leads them to consider a weaker solution con-
ceptcalledSet-Nashequilibriumwhichadmitsconstant-competitive
mechanisms. Here, rather than modifying the solution concept, we
achieve constant-competitiveness by restricting the set of allowable
misreports. As we have argued earlier, this restriction (the no late
departures assumption) is natural in the context of online mecha-
nism design.
Earlier, Ng et al. [17] presented a generalization of the model in
which jobs have both length and size, and in which there are multi-
ple units of a reusable good available in each period. Their VIRTU-
ALWORLDS mechanism generalizes the online auction presented in
this paper for the unit-length model, but was presented without com-
petitive analysis and for a model in which agents cannot misreport
their arrival time or patience.
1.4 Outline
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model we are discussing. Section 3 provides the main characteri-
zation results for truthful online allocation rules. Further general-
izations of this characterization, together with a price-based char-
acterization that applies for a model of restricted misreporting and
points beyondthe results inthispaper, are postponeduntil Section 8.
Section 4 presents several competitive truthful online mechanisms
in synchronous and asynchronous models for unit length jobs. In
Section 5, we prove that no deterministic strategyproof mechanismcan achieve a competitive ratio better than 2 for efﬁciency in the
synchronous setting. In Section 6 we consider truthful online mech-
anisms that are competitive with respect to revenue and prove that
thereisnodeterministicstrategyproofonlinemechanismwhoserev-
enue is constant-competitive with that of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism, but there is a randomized online mechanism
which achieves a competitive ratio of O(logh), where h is the ratio
of maximum value to minimum value of agents. In Section 7, we
generalize our results to the case in which the agents have different
job lengths and can lie about their processing times. Finally, we
conclude with some open problems in Section 9.
2. THE MODEL
We will consider mechanism design problems for scheduling a
single re-usable resource over a ﬁnite time interval [0,T]. In this
section we deﬁne a simple model for studying such problems. Gen-
eralizations of this basic model will also be considered.
In our basic model, there are n agents, and the type of an agent
i is characterized by an ordered triple vi = (ai,di,wi) with 0 ≤
ai ≤ di ≤ T and 0 ≤ wi < ∞. We refer to ai,di as the agent’s
arrival and departure time, respectively, and we refer to wi as the
agent’s value. The set of all possible agent types is denoted by V .
An allocation is a function x = (x1,...,xn) which assigns to each
agent a subset of [0,T] which is a ﬁnite union of subintervals, such
that distinct agents are assigned disjoint subsets.
3 The set of all such
allocations is denoted by A. For an agent i and an allocation x, let
qi(x) = 1 if the set xi ∩ [ai,di] contains an interval of length at
least 1, otherwise qi(x) = 0. The value of agent i for allocation x is
equal to qi(x)wi, i.e. the agent gets value wi if it is allocated at least
one time unit between its arrival and departure times, and otherwise
its value is zero.
We will be studying direct revelation mechanisms, in which each
agent participates by simply announcing its type. A deterministic
mechanism consists of a social choice rule (also called an alloca-
tion rule) f : V
n 7→ A and a payment rule p : V
n 7→ R
n
≥0. Here,
f(v1,...,vn) represents the allocation which is chosen when the
vector of reported types is (v1,...,vn), and pi(v1,...,vn) repre-
sents the amount agent i must pay. We will sometimes summarize
the allocation rule f by specifying the function q : V
n 7→ {0,1}
n
whose i-th component is qi(f(v1,...,vn)). Note that the value
of each agent for the allocation f(v1,...,vn) is completely deter-
mined by the value of q(v1,...,vn); for this reason, by abuse of
notation we will sometimes also refer to q as the allocation rule. We
will assume that agents have quasi-linear utilities, so the utility of
agentiforoutcomexandpaymentpi isqi(x)wi−pi. Theefﬁciency
of a mechanism is the combined value of all agents for the alloca-
tion, i.e. the quantity
P
i qi(v)wi. The revenue of a mechanism
is the sum of the payments collected from agents, i.e. the quan-
tity
P
i pi(v). We will be comparing the efﬁciency and revenue of
our mechanisms against the standard VCG mechanism, which com-
putes the allocation and payments off-line. See Krishna [12] for a
deﬁnition of VCG mechanisms.
For now, we adopt a model in which we allow only late reports
of arrivals and early reports of departures. We consider relaxations
of this deﬁnition in Section 8. As discussed in the introduction,
thisassumption isjustiﬁable inmanypractical applications, and also
necessary to obtain constant-competitive mechanisms [15].
We are interested in mechanisms that satisfy the following two
properties: voluntary participation, i.e., for every v ∈ V
n, and ev-
ery agent i with vi = (ai,di,wi), pi(v) ≤ qi(v)wi, and strate-
gyproofness (also known as truthfulness), that is, for every v ∈ V
n
with vi = (ai,di,wi) (think of v as the true types of agents), and
every bid ˆ vi = (ˆ ai, ˆ di, ˆ wi) for agent i satisfying ˆ ai ≥ ai and ˆ di ≤
3We use this general model to capture both the synchronous and
asynchronous settings, as well as job lengths greater than one. An
agent may receive multiple subintervals, but only has value for the
allocation if one of the subintervals is long enough to satisfy its
demand.
di, we have qi(v)wi − pi(v) ≥ qi((ˆ vi,v−i))wi − pi((ˆ vi,v−i)),
where v−i = (v1,...,vi−1,vi+1,...,vn) (i.e., the utility of i is
maximized if she bids truthfully).
3. CHARACTERIZING TRUTHFULNESS
In this section, we provide two simple characterization theorems
for truthful mechanisms. The ﬁrst establishes a monotonicity crite-
rion that is necessary and sufﬁcient for the existence of a payment
rule that truthfully implements a given allocation rule; this can be
considered a generalization of well-known results concerning truth-
ful mechanisms for one-parameter agents (see, for example, [1]).
The second is a necessary and sufﬁcient price-based characteriza-
tion for truthful mechanisms. Both theorems can be substantially
generalized; such generalizations will be treated in Section 8.
DEFINITION 1 (MONOTONICITY). We say that a type vi =
(ai,di,wi) dominates the type v
0
i = (a
0
i,d
0
i,w
0
i), denoted vi  v
0
i,
if ai ≤ a
0
i, di ≥ d
0
i, and wi > w
0
i. An allocation rule q : V
n 7→
{0,1}
n is called monotone if for every agent i and every v,v
0 ∈ V
n
with vi  v
0
i and vj = v
0
j for j 6= i, we have qi(v) ≥ qi(v
0).
THEOREM 2. Let q : V
n 7→ {0,1}
n be an allocation rule.
There is a payment rule p such that the mechanism (q,p) is strate-
gyproof if and only if q is monotone.
The proof of this theorem is omitted, since it will be subsumed by
the more general Theorem 6, which applies to randomized mecha-
nisms as well. Notice that Theorem 2 is existential. Whether the
payment rule can be computed efﬁciently depends on the speciﬁcs
of the model and the allocation rule.
We can now provide a price-based characterization for truthful
onlineauctionsintermsofavalue-independentpriceschedule. Con-
sider price schedule, psi(a,d,v−i), that will deﬁne the price to
agent i for an allocation, given that the agent announced interval
[a,d]. Notice this price can depend on its reported arrival and de-
parture, but not on its reported value. We can deﬁne a price-based
online auction:
DEFINITION 3 (PRICE-BASED ONLINE AUCTION). An online
auction is price-based if and only if there exists a value-independent
price schedule psi(a,d,v−i), such that for any v ∈ V and any
agent i, qi(v) = 1 if and only if psi(ai,di,v−i) 6 vi, and pay-
ments pi(v) = psi(ai,di,v−i) in this case, or zero otherwise.
DEFINITION 4 (PRICE MONOTONICITY). Prices are
monotonic if psi(a,d,v−i) 6 psi(a
0,d
0,v−i), for all a
0 > a and
d
0 6 d.
THEOREM 5. An online allocation rule f is truthfully imple-
mentable if and only if there is a truthful price-based auction with
value-independent and monotonic prices psi(a,d,v−i) that imple-
ments f.
PROOF. (⇒) We refer to the proof of Theorem 6, which appears
in the next section. If f is truthfully implementable, then the cor-
responding function q is monotone, and the proof of Theorem 6 es-
tablishes that the prices pi(v) deﬁned in (7) truthfully implement f.
Note that the right side of (7) depends only on ai,di, and v−i, and
that it is monotonically non-decreasing in ai and non-increasing in
di, so that we may use it to deﬁne the value-independent and mono-
tonic price schedule psi(a,d,v−i).
(⇐) Given an allocation rule f which is implemented by prices
psi(a,d,v−i), wemustprovethatf istruthfullyimplementable, i.e.
that the corresponding function q is monotone. This follows from
the monotonicity of prices: if vi = (ai,di,wi) dominates v
0
i =
(a
0
i,d
0
i,w
0
i), then psi(ai,di,v−i) 6 psi(a
0
i,d
0
i,v−i). Now, sup-
pose wi > w
0
i, then if qi(v
0
i,v−i) = 1 we have psi(a
0
i,d
0
i,v−i) 6
w
0
i, which implies psi(ai,di,v−i) < wi. This in turn implies
qi(v) = 1, as desired.3.1 Truthful randomized mechanisms
A randomized mechanism is a probability distribution over de-
terministic mechanisms. We assume agents are risk-neutral, so that
their utility for a probability distribution over outcomes is equal to
the expected utility of a random sample from this distribution. Note
that this means it is immaterial, from the standpoint of determining
the utility of agent i, whether the price charged to i is equal to the
random variable pi(v) or to its expectation. Accordingly, for the rest
of this section we will assume that the payment pi(v) is determinis-
tic, and that only the allocation f(v) is random. As before, we will
summarize the allocation rule f using a function q = (q1,...,qn),
where qi(v) is now deﬁned to be the probability that the time in-
terval allocated to i has length at least 1, given f(v). Note that qi
now takes values in the interval [0,1] rather than the two-element set
{0,1}. As before, the utility of agent i depends only on the value of
qi(v) and not on any other feature of the distribution of f(v). For
this reason, by abuse of notation we will sometimes refer to q (rather
than f) as the allocation rule. The word “monotone”, when applied
to such a function q, is still interpreted according to Deﬁnition 1.
THEOREM 6. Let q : V
n 7→ [0,1]
n be an allocation rule. There
is a payment rule p such that the mechanism (q,p) is strategyproof
and satisﬁes voluntary participation if and only if q is monotone.
PROOF. First, we prove the “if” part. Let q be a monotone al-
location rule and v ∈ V
n with vi = (ai,di,wi). We deﬁne the
payment rule as
pi(v) = qi(v)wi −
Z wi
0
qi((ai,di,x),v−i)dx. (1)
We show that the allocation rule q in combination with the payment
rule p constitute a strategyproof mechanism. It is also clear from the
above deﬁnition that this mechanism satisﬁes the voluntary partic-
ipation property. If the mechanism is not strategyproof, there is an
agent i, a vector v ∈ V
n of true types with vi = (ai,di,wi), and
a non-truthful bid ˆ vi = (ˆ ai, ˆ di, ˆ wi) with ˆ ai ≥ ai and ˆ di ≤ di such
that the utility qi(ˆ vi,v−i)wi−pi(ˆ vi,v−i) of agent i if she bids ˆ vi is
strictly greater than the utility viqi(v)−pi(v) that she derives from
being truthful. Using Equation 1, this can be written as follows:
(wi − ˆ wi)qi(ˆ vi,v−i) +
Z ˆ wi
0
qi((ˆ ai, ˆ di,x),v−i)dx
>
Z wi
0
qi((ai,di,x),v−i)dx. (2)
By monotonicity of q and the inequalities ˆ ai ≥ ai and ˆ di ≤ di, we
have
Z wi
0
qi((ai,di,x),v−i)dx >
Z wi
0
qi((ˆ ai, ˆ di,x),v−i)dx. (3)
Equations 2 and 3 imply
(wi − ˆ wi)qi(ˆ vi,v−i) >
Z wi
ˆ wi
qi((ˆ ai, ˆ di,x),v−i)dx. (4)
We now consider two cases: if wi > ˆ wi, then by dividing both
sides of the above inequality by wi − ˆ wi we obtain that qi(ˆ vi,v−i)
is strictly greater than the average of qi((ˆ ai, ˆ di,x),v−i) over x ∈
[ ˆ wi,wi], which contradicts the monotonicity of q. Similarly, if
wi < ˆ wi, then by dividing both sides of inequality (4) by wi −
ˆ wi we obtain that qi(ˆ vi,v−i) is strictly less than the average of
qi((ˆ ai, ˆ di,x),v−i) over x ∈ [wi, ˆ wi], which again contradicts the
monotonicity of q. This contradiction establishes the strategyproof-
ness of the mechanism with allocation rule q and payment rule p.
Conversely, assume q is an allocation rule for which there is a
payment rule p such that (q,p) is strategyproof. Consider an agent i
andtypesv,v
0 ∈ V
n withvi  v
0
i andv−i = v
0
−i suchthatqi(v) <
qi(v
0). Let vi = (ai,di,wi) and v
0
i = (a
0
i,d
0
i,w
0
i). Since vi  v
0
i,
we have wi > w
0
i. Now consider a scenario where the true types of
the agents are given by v. In this scenario, if i bids truthfully, she
will have a utility of qi(v)wi − pi(v), but if she bids v
0
i, then her
utility will be qi(v
0)wi − pi(v
0). Therefore, strategyproofness of
(q,p) implies
qi(v)wi − pi(v) > qi(v
0)wi − pi(v
0). (5)
Now, consider a scenario where the true types of the agents are v
0
and agent i might lie by announcing vi. A similar argument for this
scenario implies
qi(v
0)w
0
i − pi(v
0) > qi(v)w
0
i − pi(v). (6)
By adding inequalities 5 and 6 and using the inequality wi > w
0
i,
we obtain qi(v) > qi(v
0). Therefore, q is monotone.
It is worth remarking that the payment rule pi(v) deﬁned in (1)
is equivalent to the following simpler deﬁnition in the case of deter-
ministic mechanisms:
pi(v) = min{w
0
i : qi((ai,di,w
0
i),v−i) = 1}, if qi(v) = 1,
(7)
and pi(v) = 0 otherwise. In words, an agent that is allocated pays
the smallest value it could have reported and still received an allo-
cation.
4. MECHANISMS FOR JOBS OF UNIT
LENGTH
4.1 The synchronous model
In this section we consider the basic setting deﬁned in Section 1:
Agents arrive and depart at the beginning and end of time slots num-
bered 0,...,T (i.e., V = {(a,d,w) : a,d ∈ {0,...,T},a ≤
d,w ∈ R≥0}), and there is only one re-usable good that can be
allocated to at most one agent in each time slot. An agent wins if
she receives this good in one of the time slots between her arrival
and departure. The mechanism must decide which agent (if any)
receives the good at time slot t, based on the information available
at time t, i.e., the arrival times and the values of all agents that have
arrived at a time ≤ t, and the departure time of all agents that have
left at a time ≤ t. The payment of an agent must be computed based
on the information available at her departure (i.e. it can be delayed
past the period in which an allocation decision is made).
The following theorem shows that there is a 2-competitive strat-
egyproof mechanism for this problem. The proof of this theorem
is based on a simple greedy allocation rule that in each interval se-
lects the bidder with the highest value that has not received the good
yet. It is worth noting that this mechanism is strategyproof even if
bidders are allowed to announce an arrival time that is before their
actual arrival time.
THEOREM 7. There exists a strategyproof online 2-competitive
mechanism in the synchronous model with a single re-usable good.
PROOF. Weusethefollowinggreedyallocationrule: Atanytime
step, allocate the good to the bidder with the highest value that is
present at that time and has not received the good yet. For the pay-
ment rule, we deﬁne pi(v) by equation (7). It is clear that both our
allocation rule and our payment rule are computable in polynomial
time and in an online fashion. It is also easy to see that this alloca-
tionruleismonotone. Thereasonforthisisthatanagentiwholoses
does not affect the state of the algorithm; therefore, if i loses when
bidding (ai,di,wi), she would still lose if she arrives at a time later
than ai, leaves before di, or announces a value less than wi. Thus,
by Theorem 6 (and its proof), this mechanism is strategyproof and
satisﬁes voluntary participation.
Now, we show that this allocation rule is 2-competitive. We do
this by a charging argument. Consider an off-line optimal solution
OPT. For any agent i who wins in OPT, we charge her value to an
agent who wins in the greedy solution. If i herself is a winner in the
greedy solution, we charge her value to herself. Otherwise, let t bethetimeatwhichiwinstheauction. Sinceineverwinsinthegreedy
solution, she is present at time t, and therefore the algorithm must
pick a winner j at time t whose value is not less than the value of i.
We charge the value of i to j. It is not hard to see that this charging
scheme charges each agent j in the greedy solution at most twice,
each time for a value less than the value of j. Therefore, the value
of OPT is at most twice the value of the greedy solution.
4.2 The asynchronous model
Inthesynchronousmodelthearrivalanddeparturetimesofagents
were restricted to be integers. In the asynchronous model, we let
agents have types in V = {(a,d,w) : a,d,w ∈ R≥0, 0 ≤ a ≤
d − 1 ≤ T}, and allow the allocation of the good to an agent to
begin at any time. Furthermore, we allow the mechanism to revoke
an allocation before it is completed. This is necessary for constant-
competitiveness, since if an agent i with di = ai + 1 and a high
value wi arrives at a time that the mechanism has started but not
ﬁnished an allocation to another agent then the mechanism must in-
terrupt this ﬁrst allocation. An agent derives a value wi if she is
allocated the good for one unit of time continuously, i.e., it is not
possible to preempt and then resume jobs.
Forthismodel, thefollowingtheoremgivesa5-competitivemech-
anism. This mechanism is similar in idea to the greedy mechanism
in Theorem 7, except here once an allocation starts, we increase the
value of the corresponding agent by a multiplicative factor that in-
creases continuously over time atan exponential rate, thereby giving
her an advantage over newly arriving agents. This allows us to use
a charging argument to prove that the mechanism is 5-competitive.
We also use this algorithm in Section 7 to handle the case in which
we have different job lengths.
THEOREM 8. There exists a strategyproof online 5-competitive
mechanism in the asynchronous model with a single re-usable good.
PROOF. We modify the greedy algorithm in the proof of Theo-
rem 7 as follows. We call a point t in time critical if a new agent
arrives at time t, or an allocation completes at time t. At any crit-
ical point t, we compare the values of all agents that are present at
time t, and have not been allocated the good for one unit of time
continuously. If there is an agent in this set who has already had the
good for δ < 1 units of time before time t (i.e., she has received
an allocation at time t − δ and has not been interrupted after that),
then we multiply the value of this agent by 2
δ before comparing it to
the values of other agents. After the comparison, the agent with the
highest value receives the allocation. If this agent is different from
the agent who has had the allocation since t − δ, the latter agent is
interrupted.
Forthepaymentrule, weagainusethegeneralrulegivenbyequa-
tion (7). This rule can be implemented efﬁciently as follows: For
each agent i who wins, we run the algorithm without this agent, and
let T denote the set of all critical points t ∈ [ai,di] in this run. For
every t ∈ T, we deﬁne the value at time t as the maximum over
the values of all agents that are present in the system at t and have
not received the allocation for one continuous unit of time before t.
We now calculate the price of allocation for i at time t by taking the
maximum, over all t
0 ∈ (t,t+1), of the value at t
0 divided by 2
t0−t.
Also, if there is an allocation to an agent j that is started at time t−δ
for some 0 ≤ δ < 1 and continues beyond t, we take the maximum
of the above value and 2
δ times the value of j, and let the price for
i at time t be the maximum of these values. The payment of i is the
minimum, over all t ∈ [ai,di − 1] of the price of allocation to i at
time t. It is clear that the allocation and payment rules are both ef-
ﬁciently computable in an online fashion. Furthermore, it is easy to
see that the payment computed by the above algorithm is the same
as the one given in the proof of Theorem 6, and therefore in order to
establish the strategyproofness of our mechanism, we only need to
prove its monotonicity.
Monotonicity of our allocation rule is easy to see for the depar-
ture time and the value: If an agent i does not win when the types of
agents are v, then she will not win if she lowers her value or leaves
earlier than her true departure time. Consider a situation where i
announces an arrival time a
0
i after her true arrival time ai. If agent
i does not receive an allocation in the interval [ai,a
0
i] in the truthful
scenario, then the behavior of the algorithm is the same in both sce-
narios and therefore i does not win in the non-truthful scenario. If
she starts an allocation in this interval, then the behavior of the al-
gorithm in these scenarios might be different, since during the time
intervals that were allocated to i in the truthful scenario, other agent
might receive the allocation in the non-truthful scenario. The value
of these agents cannot be higher than the value of i. But we know
that any allocation to i in the truthful scenario is interrupted before
it completes. Hence, allocations made during the same time inter-
vals in the non-truthful scenario must also be interrupted. Therefore,
the state of the algorithm at time a
0
i is the same in both scenarios.
Thus, i does not win in the non-truthful scenario. This establishes
the monotonicity of our allocation rule.
We now prove that this algorithm is 5-competitive. This is done
by charging the value of any winning agent in an optimal solution
OPT to a winning agent in our algorithm. We assume, without loss
of generality, that OPT does not interrupt any allocation. For any
winning agent i in OPT, if she is also a winner in our algorithm,
then her value is charged to herself. Otherwise, consider the time
t at which i is allocated the good in OPT. At this time, our algo-
rithm has allocated the good to an agent j0. This agent might be
interrupted in our algorithm. If she is interrupted, let j1 be the agent
that interrupts her. We continue this chain until we reach an agent
jk who is not interrupted, and charge the value of i to this agent. We
now calculate the maximum total value charged to an agent j with
value wj who wins at time t in our algorithm. If j wins in OPT,
there is a charge of wj. Consider an agent i in OPT whose value
is charged to j. Let t
0 = t − δ be the time at which i receives an
allocation in OPT. It is clear from the algorithm that δ > −1 and
the value of i is at most 2
−δwj. Also, the value of δ for any two
such i’s must be apart by at least one. Therefore, the total charge
to j is at most wj +
P∞
l=−1 2
−lwj = 5wj. This shows that our
algorithm is 5-competitive.
There is an example which shows that the above analysis is tight,
i.e., the competitive ratio of the above algorithm is not better than 5.
4.3 Multiple re-usable goods
Finally, we show that both mechanisms proposed above can be
generalized to the case where there are k identical re-usable goods
instead of one, achieving the same competitive ratios. (Formally,
the setting of k identical re-usable goods is deﬁned using the same
model as in Section 2, except that the set of allocations A is enlarged
to encompass all functions mapping agents to subintervals of [0,T],
such that each t ∈ [0,T] belongs to at most k such subintervals.)
THEOREM 9. There is a strategyproof online mechanism which
is 2-competitive (5-competitive) for efﬁciency, in the synchronous
(asynchronous) model with k re-usable goods.
PROOF. The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Theo-
rem 7, except that the greedy allocation rule gives the goods at time
t to the unassigned bidders with the k largest values at time t.
5. COMPETITIVE RATIO LOWER BOUND
In this section we prove that no deterministic strategyproof mech-
anism can achieve a competitive ratio strictly better than 2 in the
synchronous setting. This shows that the result of Theorem 7 is
tight. Note that if we do not care about truthfulness, the best known
lower bound for the problem is the Golden ratio (≈ 1.618) [8].
THEOREM 10. No truthful online deterministic mechanism can
obtain a (2 − )-approximation for efﬁciency in the synchronous
model with a single re-usable good for any constant  > 0.PROOF. Suppose, there is a truthful online deterministic mecha-
nism A which can obtain a 2 −  approximation for efﬁciency. We
design a set of scenarios for which we obtain a contradiction on the
behavior of the algorithm.
First scenario is as follows. Assume that we have two agents. The
ﬁrst one called x has type vx = (1,2,1 + δ), where 0 < δ <

1−.
Assume there is another agent y whose type is vy = (1,3,1). In
this case, if agents are truthful, mechanism A should assign x to
the ﬁrst time slot and assign y to the second time slot. In addition,
mechanism A should always charge x less than 1 + δ, otherwise x
has motivation to lie about its value. It means for positive δ, x has a
positive utility in this scenario.
In the next scenario, we have an agent y
0 which behaves the same
as agent y does in the previous scenario, i.e., vy0 = vy. We have
an agent x
0 of type vx0 = (1,3,1 + δ). Finally, we have an agent
z
0 of type vz0 = (2,3,∞). In this case, we claim that mechanism
A should always assign x
0 to the ﬁrst time slot, since otherwise
x
0 can lie about its type to announce it the same as that of x in
the previous scenario and still get a positive value. Note that in
this case, x
0 cannot be assigned to the second time slot because of
agent z, whose value is very large, and at time 1, mechanism A
does not know whether such an agent exists or not. In addition, in
this scenario, agent y
0 cannot be assigned to any time slot.
Finally, we consider the third scenario in which we have two
agents x
00 and z
00 for which vx00 = vx and vz00 = vz0, and an-
other agent y
00 for which vy00 = (1,2,1). In this case, mechanism
A should not assign y
00 to the ﬁrst time slot. The reason is that in
this case, y
00 has a positive value (since mechanism A should charge
y
00 less than one) and thus in the second scenario, agent y
0 could lie
about its type to announce it the same as that of y
00 in this scenario
and thus get a positive value (agent y
0 had zero value in the second
scenario.) It means in this scenario, if agent z
00 does not appear at
all, since mechanism A does not know about it at time 1, still agent
y
00 should not be assigned to any time slot. Thus the mechanism
obtain efﬁciency at most 1 + δ, though the optimum efﬁciency is
2 + δ in this case. Since
2+δ
1+δ > 2 −  by the choice of δ, we have
the desired contradiction to the existence of mechanism A.
6. REVENUE OF THE AUCTION
Theorems 7 and 8 established the existence of mechanisms whose
efﬁciency is constant-competitive with that of the VCG mechanism.
In contrast to these positive results, there is no strategyproof mech-
anism whose revenue is constant-competitive with that of the VCG
mechanism, if we insist on mechanisms which satisfy the following
axiom.
DEFINITION 11. An impatient bidder is an agent with arrival
and departure times (ai,di) satisfying di = ai + 1, i.e. an agent
who can only accept an allocation at time ai. We say that a mech-
anism M considers impatient bidders anonymously if it has the fol-
lowing property: whenever M assigns a time slot t to an impatient
bidder x with value w, there is no impatient bidder y with arrival
time t whose value is strictly greater than w.
THEOREM 12. If M is a truthful, deterministic online mecha-
nism satisfying voluntary participation, and M considers impatient
bidders anonymously, then the competitive ratio of M with respect
to the VCG revenue is not bounded above by any constant C.
PROOF. Suppose M is a truthful deterministic online mecha-
nism whose revenue is C-competitive with the off-line VCG mech-
anism, for some constant C, and suppose M considers impatient
bidders anonymously. We will derive a contradiction using a series
of scenarios, as in the proof of Theorem 10. All of our scenar-
ios will involve a timeline with time slots numbered 0,1,...,T,
a set of patient bidders {A1,A2,...,Aq} each with value 3, ar-
rival time 0, and departure time T, and pairs of impatient bidders
B0,C0,B1,C1, ...,BT,CT, such that Bi and Ci both arrive at
time i and depart at time i + 1, and whose values satisfy w(Bi) <
w(Ci). In any such scenario, the agent winning time slot i in the
off-line VCG mechanism has a VCG payment which is bounded
below by w(Bi), hence the VCG revenue is bounded below by PT
i=0 w(Bi).
This lower bound proof is a bit more complicated than the proof
of Theorem 10, so we will ﬁrst give an outline of the main ideas. By
considering a series of scenarios {Υk}, we will prove the following
fact: if agents {A1,A2,...,Aq} (deﬁned as above) arrive at time 0
along with impatient bidders B0,C0 with values 1 and 2, then M
can not allocate the time slot to B0 or C0. Since the VCG revenue
in this case is bounded below by 1, we know that M must collect at
least 1/C in revenue. Next we will consider a carefully constructed
series of scenarios {Ψq}, in which the set of agents at time 0 is as
above, and all agents arriving after time 0 are impatient and have
values much smaller than 1/C. Using Ψq, we will show that it is
impossible for M to guarantee at least 1/C in revenue. Roughly
speaking, this is because truthfulness prevents M from extracting
much revenue from the patient bidder who wins time slot 0, and (for
q large enough) there will not be enough time after this to make up
the difference.
Scenario Υk (1 ≤ k ≤ T) is speciﬁed as follows. Choose a
sufﬁciently large number x (any number greater than 2C + 3Cq
will sufﬁce), and put w(Bi) = x
i, w(Ci) = 2x
i for 0 ≤ i ≤
k, w(Bi) = w(Ci) = 0 for i > k. The VCG revenue in this
case is at least 1 + x + ... + x
k. If M does not allocate time
slot k to Bk or Ck, then its revenue is bounded above by 3q +
(1+x+...+x
k−1) (due to the voluntary participation constraint)
and this is less than 1/C times the VCG revenue, by our choice of
x. Thus we may conclude that in scenario Υk, M allocates time
slot of k to an impatient bidder. Since M is an online mechanism,
and Υk is indistinguishable from ΥT until time k + 1, we may
conclude that in scenario ΥT, each time slot k > 1 is allocated to
an impatient bidder. If M also allocates time slot 0 to an impatient
bidder, then each of the patient bidders A1,...,Aq derives zero
utility in scenario ΥT. This contradicts truthfulness, since Ai may
derive positive utility by announcing value 2+, arrival time 0, and
departure time 1. (In this case, Ai will win time slot 0 and pay at
most 2 + , since M considers impatient bidders anonymously and
satisﬁes voluntary participation.)
Now let y be a very small number (any number smaller than
1/48C
3 willsufﬁce)andconsiderascenariowithagentsA1,...,Aq
and B0, C0 deﬁned as before, and with impatient bidders Bi, Ci
at time i whose values are y, 2y respectively. The VCG revenue
is unbounded as a function of T, hence if M is C-competitive it
must eventually allocate a time slot i > 0 to one of the impatient
bidders Bi, Ci. Let τq be the ﬁrst such time slot. Deﬁne a series
of scenarios {Ψq : 0 ≤ q ≤ 6C
2} as follows: in scenario Ψq,
there are agents A1,...,Aq with arrival time 0, departure time T,
and value 3, there are impatient bidders B0, C0 at time 0 with val-
ues 1, 2, respectively, there are impatient bidders Bi, Ci at time
i(1 ≤ i < τq−1) with values y, 2y, respectively, and there is an
impatient bidder Bi with value y at time i = τq−1. (When q = 0,
we intepret τq−1 to mean τ0 + 1.) By considering Ψ0 we can get
an explicit upper bound on τ0. The VCG revenue in scenario Ψ0 is
1 + τ0y, whereas the revenue of M is bounded above by 2 + 2y,
hence C(2 + 2y) ≥ 1 + τ0y, i.e. τ0 ≤ 2C(1 + 1/y).
Now we will consider Ψq for q > 0, obtaining a lower bound on
τq−1 − τq. The argument proceeds as follows. By the deﬁnition
of τq, we know that M doesn’t allocate any time slots to impa-
tient bidders until time τq, so the revenue from impatient bidders
is at most 2y max(0,τq−1 − τq + 1), by voluntary participation.
For each patient bidder Ai, it is possible to receive time slot τq−1
at a price of at most 2y by declaring an arrival time of τq−1, de-
parture time τq−1 + 1, and value 2y. In such a case, time slot
τq−1 will be allocated to Ai because M considers impatient bid-
ders anonymously, and the price will be at most 2y by voluntary
participation. As M is truthful, it must be the case that Ai de-
rives at least as much utility from truthfully announcing her type.Thus M can not charge Ai a price greater than 2y, so the com-
bined revenue from patient bidders is at most 2qy. Using the trivial
lower bound of 1 on the VCG revenue, and the C-competitiveness
of M, we now have 1 6 2Cqy + 2Cy max(0,τq−1 − τq + 1).
We have q 6 6C
2 and y < 1/48C
3, hence 2Cqy < 1/4. Thus
3/4 < 2Cy max(0,τq−1 − τq + 1), i.e., τq−1 − τq >
3
8Cy − 1.
Summing over q = 1,2,...,6C
2 we obtain τ0 >
9C
4y −6C
2. Com-
bining this with the upper bound τ0 ≤ 2C(1 + 1/y) from earlier,
we see that
2C
y + 2C >
9C
4y − 6C
2, i.e. 6C + 2 >
1
4y > 12C
3, a
contradiction since C ≥ 1.
BycloselyexaminingtheproofofTheorem12, wecanstrengthen
it to the following result.
COROLLARY 13. Suppose that the bids wi are constrained to
belong to an interval [a,b] whose endpoints are known to the mech-
anism designer, and let h = b/a. If M is a truthful, deterministic
online mechanism which considers impatient bidders anonymously
and satisﬁes voluntary participation, then the competitive ratio of
M with respect to the VCG revenue is at least Ω

log h
log log h
1/4
.
PROOF. Let us explicitly determine an interval [a,b] containing
all the bid values considered in the scenarios {Υk} and {Ψq} which
arose in the proof of Theorem 12. The smallest bid considered was
y, in scenario Ψq for all values of q. Note that y may be taken to be
equal to 1/49C
3. The largest bid considered was 2x
T in scenario
ΥT. Here x may be taken to be 3C(1+q) < 20C
3, since q ≤ 6C
2.
The largest value of T considered was T = τ0 ≤ 2C(1 + 1/y) ≤
100C
4, in scenario Ψ0. Thus x
T = O(C
300C4
). Therefore the
bid interval [a,b] = [y,2x
T] satisﬁes b/a = O

C
O(C4)

, and the
right side is at most h, for some C = O

log h
log log h
1/4
.
Next we show that a randomized mechanism can nearly match
the lower bound established in Corollary 13, even if the bid inter-
val [a,b] is not known in advance. Speciﬁcally, the revenue of our
mechanism is O(logh)-competitive with the VCG revenue, where
h is the ratio of maximum value to minimum value of agents. This
result can be considered parallel to a result of Lavi and Nisan [14],
who derived the same revenue competitive ratio in a different online
auction setting. However, it is worth noting that their result requires
foreknowledge of the bid interval [a,b].
THEOREM 14. There is a randomized online mechanism which
achieves a competitive ratio of O(logh) when all bids belong to an
interval [a,b] satisfying b/a = h. The mechanism need not know
the values of a and b.
PROOF. For simplicity, we will work in the synchronous model.
The same competitive ratio can be achieved in the asynchronous
model by incorporating the mechanism from Theorem 8 into this
proof.
Suppose ﬁrst that the bid interval is known to be [1,h]. Then the
mechanism is extremely simple: at time 0, guess a random power of
2 between 1 and h and deﬁne this to be the reserve price p. In each
period, if there is at least one bidder present whose bid is above p
and has not yet been satisﬁed, choose one such bidder at random and
allocate the time slot to that bidder, charging a price of p. For each
periodt, ifthe VCGmechanismallocatesttoabidderxandcharges
q to that bidder, then with probability 1/dlog2(h)e the random price
p satisﬁes q/2 6 p < q. If so, then either the mechanism charges p
to x, or it charges p to an agent who is allocated time slot t. Using a
charging scheme as in the proof of Theorem 7, this implies that the
mechanism’s competitive ratio is bounded above by 4dlog2(h)e.
If the bid interval is not known initially, then it is a bit harder to
design a O(logh)-competitive mechanism. We will deﬁne such a
mechanism, which combines the random-reserve-price notion intro-
duced above, the greedy mechanism analyzed earlier, and a random
partitioning technique which is often useful in designing competi-
tive auctions. At time 0, the mechanism samples a random number
ξk independently from the uniform distribution on [0,1], for each
integer k. (Of course, in an actual implementation the numbers ξk
will be determined by lazy evaluation, i.e. we sample ξk the ﬁrst
time we need to examine its value and not earlier.) A random par-
tition of the set of agents into two sets A,B is computed online, by
assigning each agent (at its arrival time) randomly, independently,
and equiprobably to A or B. For each agent i, we now determine a
thresholdpricescheduleαt(i)asfollows. Ifi ∈ B,thenαt(i) = ∞
for all t. Let At (resp. Bt) denote the set of agents arriving at or
before time t, and assigned to set A (resp. B). If i ∈ A and Bt is
the empty set, αt(i) = 0. Otherwise, let wmin(Bt),wmax(Bt) be
the minimum and maximum bids reported by agents in Bt. Among
all integers k such that wmin(Bt)/2 ≤ 2
k < wmax(Bt), choose the
one for which ξk is minimum, and set αt(i) = 2
k in i ∈ A.
At time t, the mechanism computes its allocation as follows. It
ﬁrst deﬁnes a set of eligible agents, by taking the set At and remov-
ing all agents who have been allocated a time slot in a previous pe-
riod. If the set of eligible agents is non-empty, then an eligible agent
i with maximum bid value is chosen (randomly and uniformly, if
there is more than one eligible agent with maximum bid value) and
is declared the winner at time t. Letting wi denote the bid value of
this winning agent i, the mechanism allocates time slot t to agent i
if αt(i) < wi; otherwise t is unallocated.
The pricing rule is deﬁned as follows. For each agent i, a price
schedule pt(i) is computed by simulating the same allocation rule
with agent i absent. (All other random choices, including the par-
tition of the remaining agents into sets A,B, are unchanged in the
simulation.) Letting βt(i) denote the bid of the agent who is the
winner at time t in this simulation (or βt(i) = 0 if there is no win-
ner), we set
pt(i) = max{αt(i),βt(i)}.
The payment for agent i is determined by the value-independent,
monotone price schedule psi(a,d,v−i) = mina≤t≤d pt(i). It is
easy to check that this price schedule implements the allocation rule
described above, hence the mechanism is strategyproof by Theo-
rem 5.
To prove that the mechanism is O(logh)-competitive with the
VCG revenue, we begin by identifying a set of agents whose con-
tribution to the VCG revenue may be easily bounded. An agent
i with type (ai,di,wi) is pitiful if the VCG mechanism charges
a positive price to agent i, yet there exists an integer ki such that
2
ki−1 < wi ≤ 2
ki and every other bid received at or before time
ai is greater than 2
ki. (We call ki the index of pitiful agent i.) Note
that for distinct pitiful agents i,j with arrival times ai ≤ aj, the
indices ki,kj are also distinct and satisfy ki > kj. Thus the sum of
the bids of all pitiful agents is bounded above by 2
k∗+1, where k
∗
is the index of the earliest-arriving pitiful agent, if there is any such
agent.
Let t0 be the earliest time at which more than one agent arrives.
(If there is no such time, then the VCG revenue is zero and there is
nothing to prove.) Let w1 ≥ w2 be the two largest bids arriving at
time t0 (corresponding to agents i1,i2, respectively) and note that
w2 > 2
k∗−1, since t0 is no later than the arrival time of the earliest
pitiful agent. With probability 1/4, i1 ∈ A, i2 ∈ B. If so, the
probability that our mechanism allocates time slot t0 to an agent at
a price of at least 2
k∗−1 is at least 1/dlog2(h)e. It follows that the
total amount charged to pitiful agents by the VCG mechanism is at
most 16dlog2(h)e times the expected revenue of our mechanism.
It remains to bound the total amount charged to non-pitiful agents
by the VCG mechanism. Assume that VCG allocates time slot t to
non-pitiful agent i at a price p > 0. Let 2
m be the largest power of
2 less than wi. We claim there exist agents j 6= i,k 6= i, arriving at
or before time ai, such that wj ≥ p and wk/2 ≤ 2
m. The existence
of agent k follows from the fact that i is not pitiful. The existence
of agent j follows from the truthfulness of the VCG mechanism;otherwise, i could improve its utility by claiming that its departure
time is ai + 1 and its value is p − ε, for some sufﬁciently small
positive ε.
With probability 1/2, i ∈ A. If so, the allocation rule satisﬁes
one of the following properties:
1. There exists a time at which agent i is a winner.
2. The winner at time t is not agent i, but this agent bids at least
as much as agent i.
In the ﬁrst case, let i
0 = i and let t
0 be the time at which i wins.
In the second case, let i
0 be the winner at time t and let t
0 = t.
(Note that t
0 > ai in both cases, since i is ineligible in time slots
earlier than ai. Note also that i
0 ∈ A, since agents in B are never
eligible.) Deﬁning agents j,k as above, and conditioning on the
event i ∈ A, the probability that j,k ∈ B is at least 1/4. (It is
equal to 1/4 unless j = k.) By the properties of agents j and k,
the interval [min{wj,wk}/2,max{wj,wk}) contains a power of
2 between p/2 and wi0, say 2
`. Conditional on the event that i ∈
A, j,k ∈ B, the probability is at least 1/dlog2(h)e that αt0(i
0) =
αT(i
0) = 2
`. Thus, while the VCG mechanism charges p to agent i,
our mechanism charges at least (16dlog2(h)e)
−1p in expectation to
agent i
0. This argument credits a given agent i
0 at most twice: once
when i = i
0, and once when t is the time slot which our mechanism
allocates to i
0. Thus the expected amount charged to non-pitiful
agents by the VCG mechanism is at most 32dlog2(h)e times the
revenue of our mechanism.
It may seem that the revenue of the VCG mechanism is a rather
weak benchmark against which to compare our mechanism’s rev-
enue. However, as illustrated by Theorem 12, deterministic truth-
ful mechanisms can not be constant-competitive even against this
benchmark. Moreover, the VCG revenue is at least as large as the
maximum total value of a feasible allocation to the set of agents that
are disjoint from those satisﬁed by the optimal allocation. This fol-
lows from the fact that the sets of agents who can win the auction
simultaneously form a matroid [4, 21].
It is also worth mentioning that the greedy mechanism used in the
proof of Theorem 7, which is 2-competitive for efﬁciency, can have
anarbitrarilybadcompetitiveratiowithrespecttotheVCGrevenue.
Considern+2agents, 1ton+2, asfollows. Agenti, 2 6 i 6 n+1,
has type vi = (i − 1,i + 1,2). Agent 1 has type v1 = (1,2,1) and
agent n+2 has type vn+2 = (n+1,n+2,1). It is easy to observe
that off-line VCG charges each of agents 2,...,n + 1 a price of 1
and thus collects n for revenue. However, the greedy algorithm only
chargesagent2apriceof1andallothers0. Itmeansthecompetitive
ratio of the greedy mechanism for revenue can be arbitrarily large.
7. DIFFERENT JOB LENGTHS
In this section we consider the case where jobs are allowed to
have different lengths. In other words, each agent’s type is now
characterized by four values: ai, di, wi, and Li, where ai,di are
interpreted as before, and Li is a positive real number specifying
the length of job i. The value of a given outcome x for agent i is
equal to wi if the subset of [0,T] allocated to i contains an interval
whose length is at least Li, otherwise x has zero value for i.
First, we start by assuming that all job lengths are in an interval
[Lmin,Lmax] which is known to the mechanism beforehand. Using
a technique similar to that adopted in Section 6, we show that there
exists a strategyproof mechanism that achieves a competitive ratio
of O(log(Lmax/Lmin)) for efﬁciency.
THEOREM 15. There is a randomized strategyproof mechanism
that achieves a competitive ratio of O(log(Lmax/Lmin)) for efﬁ-
ciency when all job lengths are in an interval [Lmin,Lmax] known
to the mechanism, even if agents are allowed to lie about their
length.
PROOF. The mechanism is as follows: let L be a random power
of two in the interval [Lmin,2Lmax]. Every job of length more than
L is rejected. Jobs of length less than or equal to L are treated like
jobs of length L. Finally, the mechanism in Theorem 8 is used to
schedule these jobs. We observe that this allocation rule has a truth-
ful implementation. First, notice that since the mechanism rounds
all job lengths that are less than L to L and removes jobs of length
greater than L, no agent can beneﬁt by lying about their length.
Therefore, we only need to prove truthfulness with respect to other
parameters. By Theorem 6, it is enough to show that the allocation
rule is monotone. Monotonicity with respect to values and departure
times is obvious. Monotonicity with respect to arrival times follows
from the monotonicity of the mechanism in Theorem 8.
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We now show that the above allocation rule achieves a competi-
tive ratio of O(log(Lmax/Lmin)) for efﬁciency. Consider an opti-
mal solution OPT. Let L1,L2,...,Lk denote all powers of two in
the interval [Lmin,2Lmax]. We partition the set of jobs served in
the solution OPT into k subsets OPT1,...,OPTk, where OPTi
is the set of jobs in OPT that have length more than Li−1 and less
than Li (we let L0 := Lmin). For each i, we number the jobs in
OPTi with consecutive natural numbers in the order that they are
servedinthesolution, andletOPT
0
i bethesetofoddnumberedjobs
or the set of even numbered jobs in OPTi, whichever has higher
total value. Clearly, the sum of the values of jobs in OPT
0
i is at
least half the sum of values of jobs in OPTi. Furthermore, if we
round the length of all jobs in OPT
0
i up to Li, we obtain a feasible
solution of the instance constructed in the mechanism if the value
L picked by the mechanism is Li. Therefore, by Theorem 8, the
value of the solution found by the allocation rule conditioned on
L = Li is at least 1/5 times the value of jobs in OPT
0
i. Since
for each i, the probability that L = Li is 1/dlog(Lmax/Lmin)e,
the expected value of the solution found by our mechanism is at
least O(1/log(Lmax/Lmin)) times the sum of values of OPTi for
i = 1,...,k, or O(1/log(Lmax/Lmin)) times the value of the
optimal solution.
When the interval [Lmin,Lmax] is not known in advance, the fol-
lowing theorem shows that we can still achieve a competitive ratio
of O(log(Lmax/Lmin)) using a mechanism that is strategyproof
with respect to all parameters except job lengths. The proof is very
similar to the proofs of Theorems 14 and 15, and is deferred to the
full version of this paper.
THEOREM 16. There is a randomized strategyproof mechanism
that achieves a competitive ratio of O(log(Lmax/Lmin)) for efﬁ-
ciency when all job lengths are in an interval [Lmin,Lmax]. The
mechanism need not know the values of Lmin and Lmax, but as-
sumes that the agents do not lie about their length.
8. A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR
TRUTHFUL ONLINE AUCTIONS
In this section, we generalize the characterization in Section 3 to
other models of misreporting in online auctions and extend the ex-
isting theory on price-based characterizations of truthful auctions to
models with restricted misreporting. The standard theory of truth-
ful mechanisms states that a truthful mechanism must be imple-
mented in terms of an agent-independent price function [13], where
the price to an agent is independent of its reported type. This need
not be the case in truthful online auctions, where a patient agent
can make a smaller payment than if it was less patient, even when
it would receive the good in the same period. This can occur, for
instance, in the simple unit-length synchronous auction. In online
auctions the price can depend on an agent’s reported arrival and de-
parture, although not on its reported value. Prices must satisfy a
monotonicity property with respect to reported arrivals and depar-
tures and allocations must be carefully timed for some misreporting
4Notice that here we are using the fact that job lengths that are less
than L are all rounded up to L. Without this, the allocation rule
would not be monotone with respect to arrival times and can not be
truthfully implemented.models. Auctions that are based on agent-independent price sched-
ules, psi(t,v−i) in period t, are truthful with appropriate timing
requirements. However, the existence of a simple price schedule of
this kind is not necessary for truthfulness.
8.1 Restricted Misreports
In the main model in this paper, we considered agents that can
only report late arrivals and early departures. This is an example of
a domain in which there is restricted misreporting of agent type.
Let L(vi) ⊆ Vi denote the available misreports (or lies) available
to agent i with value vi. We assume transitivity, so that v
0
i ∈ L(vi)
and v
00
i ∈ L(v
0
i) implies v
00
i ∈ L(vi). The standard mechanism
design model has L(vi) = Vi and the standard multiagent model
with cooperative agents has L(vi) = vi. A general deﬁnition of
truthfulness in this model is as follows:
DEFINITION 17 (TRUTHFULNESS). A mechanism (f,p) for
social choice rule, f : V
n → A, and payment rule, p : V
n → R
n
>0,
is truthful if for any agent i and any v−i ∈ V−i, and any vi ∈ Vi
and ˆ vi ∈ L(vi), we have vi(f(v)) − pi(v) > vi(f(ˆ vi,v−i)) −
pi(ˆ vi,v−i).
The following lemma provides a price-based characterization of
truthful mechanisms in domains with restricted misreporting. The
price can depend on an agent’s reported type, but in a limited way.
LEMMA 18. For available lies L, a function f is truthful if and
only if there exists a price function, ˜ pi : A × Vi × V−i → R ∪ ∞,
such that,
(B1) For any agent i, any v ∈ V , any x ∈ A, if there exists v
0
i ∈
L(vi) such that f(v
0
i,v−i) = x then price ˜ pi(x,vi,v−i) =
min{˜ pi(x,v
0
i,v−i) : v
0
i ∈ L(vi),f(v
0
i,v−i) = x}, other-
wise ˜ pi(x,vi,v−i) = ∞.
(B2) For any agent i, any v ∈ V , f(v) ∈ argmaxx∈A{vi(x) −
˜ pi(x,vi,v−i)}.
PROOF. (⇐) By contradiction, suppose (B1) and (B2) hold but
thatf isnottruthful. Wecandeﬁnepaymentspi(v) = ˜ pi(x,vi,v−i)
for x = f(v). Consider some v and v
0
i ∈ L(vi), for which vi(x) −
pi(v) < vi(y) − pi(v
0
i,v−i) and x = f(v), y = f(v
0
i,v−i). By
(B1) we have pi(v
0
i,v−i) = ˜ pi(y,v
0
i,v−i) > ˜ pi(y,vi,v−i), and
vi(x) − ˜ pi(x,vi,v−i) < vi(y) − ˜ pi(y,vi,v−i), a contradiction
with (B2).
(⇒) Given a truthful f, we know there is a payment function
pi(v). To show (B1) and (B2), we construct the price function
˜ pi : A × Vi × V−i → R ∪ ∞, as follows. For any i, v ∈ V ,
and x ∈ A, if there exists v
0
i ∈ L(vi) such that f(v
0
i,vi) = x we
set ˜ pi(x,vi,v−i) = min{pi(v
0
i,v−i) : v
0
i ∈ L(vi),f(v
0
i,v−i) =
x}, otherwise ˜ pi(x,vi,v−i) = ∞. To show (B1), ﬁx some x,
some vi and some v−i for which there is a v
0
i ∈ L(vi) for which
f(v
0
i,v−i) = x. First, therecanbeno ˆ vi ∈ L(vi)withf(ˆ vi,v−i) =
x for which ˜ pi(x,vi,v−i) > ˜ pi(x, ˆ vi,v−i), because this would
give,
min{pi(v
0
i,v−i) : v
0
i ∈ L(vi),f(v
0
i,v−i) = x}
> min{pi(v
00
i ,v−i) : v
00
i ∈ L(ˆ vi),f(v
0
i,v−i) = x},
which contradicts the transitivity of misreporting. So, we have
˜ pi(x,vi,v−i) 6
min{˜ pi(x,v
0
i,v−i) : v
0
i ∈ L(vi),f(v
0
i,v−i) = x},
which together with
˜ pi(x,vi,v−i) >
min{˜ pi(x,v
0
i,v−i) : v
0
i ∈ L(vi),f(v
0
i,v−i) = x},
gives (B1) (since v
0
i = vi ∈ L(vi)).
Now, we show the same price function also satisﬁes (B2). By
contradiction, consider some v such that f(v) = x and vi(x) −
˜ pi(x,vi,v−i) < vi(y) − ˜ pi(y,vi,v−i). Let v
0
i ∈ L(vi) be the type
that determined ˜ pi(y,vi,v−i), i.e. for which f(v
0
i,vi) = y and for
which pi(v
0
i,v−i) = ˜ pi(y,vi,v−i). When other agents declare v−i
and agent i has true type vi it is better to declare v
0
i ∈ L(vi), a
contradiction with truthfulness.
Given price functions ˜ pi(x,vi,v−i) satisfying conditions (B1)
and (B2) we can deﬁne a payment rule pi(v) = ˜ pi(f(v),vi,v−i)
that implements f truthfully. Thus, the agent’s payment is the price
for the optimal alternative, as chosen by the allocation rule.
Note that payments can depend on the reported type of an agent
but only in a restricted way (B1). In words, the price on alternative x
given report vi must be the lowest price that is available to the agent
given misreports that are possible for a type of vi. When misreports
are unrestricted we recover the standard agent-independent price-
based characterization:
COROLLARY 19. For unrestricted reports, then for any truthful
function f, there exists an agent-independent price function, ˜ pi :
A × V−i → R ∪ ∞, such that for any v ∈ V and any agent i,
f(v) ∈ argmaxx∈A{vi(x) − ˜ pi(x,v−i)}.
PROOF. Observe that if L(vi) = Vi, then for any v−i ∈ V−i,
and any x ∈ A, we have
˜ pi(x,vi,v−i) = min{˜ pi(x,v
0
i,v−i) : v
0
i ∈ L(vi),f(v
0
i,v−i) = x}
= min{˜ pi(x,v
0
i,v−i) : f(v
0
i,v−i) = x}
= ˜ pi(x,v−i)
forallvi ∈ Vi, where ˜ pi(x,v−i)isanagent-independentpricefunc-
tion that does not depend on the reported type of agent i.
8.2 Application to online auctions
In this section we state generalizations of the monotonicity and
price-based characterizations in Section 3 to additional models of
misreporting. These characterizations generalize well-known re-
sults in the case of one-parameter agents (see, for example, [1]) and
strengthen Theorem 3 in [7]. For space reasons, the proofs in this
section are omitted; they will appear in the full version of this paper.
We consider the following three models of misreporting:
(A1) L(vi) = {v
0
i = (a
0
i,d
0
i,w
0
i) : a
0
i > ai,d
0
i 6 di,any w
0
i}
(A2) L(vi) = {v
0
i = (a
0
i,d
0
i,w
0
i) : a
0
i > ai,any d
0
i,any w
0
i}
(A3) L(vi) = {v
0
i = (a
0
i,d
0
i,w
0
i) : d
0
i 6 di,any a
0
i,any w
0
i}
Although we focus on Model A1 in this paper (since it seems more
realistic), all of our truthful mechanisms in Sections 4 and 6 can be
also stated for the more general Model A3.
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The notion of critical value will be important in deﬁning the char-
acterization.
DEFINITION 20 (CRITICAL VALUE). The critical value
v
c(a,d,v−i) is the minimal value w
0
i, with v
0
i = (a,d,w
0
i) for
which qi(v
0
i,v−i) = 1, or ∞ if qi(v
0
i,v−i) = 0 for all w
0
i.
For models A2 and A3 we deﬁne the notion of a critical period,
Ic(a,d,v−i) ⊆ T, which will limit when allocations can be made.
DEFINITION 21 (CRITICAL PERIOD FOR MODEL A2). In
model A2, Ic(a,d,v−i) = [t,d]where periodt is deﬁned as the ear-
liest t ∈ [a,d] for which v
c(a,t,v−i) = minτ:a6τ6d v
c(a,τ,v−i).
DEFINITION 22 (CRITICAL PERIOD FOR MODEL A3). In
model A3, Ic(a,d,v−i) = [a,t] where period t is deﬁned as the lat-
est t ∈ [a,d] for which v
c(t,d,v−i) = minτ:a6τ6d v
c(τ,d,v−i).
An online allocation rule is said to be supported by a price sched-
ule psi(a,d,v−i) in the sense of the price-based online auctions
(Deﬁnition 3), so that the rule allocates a good to the agent if and
only if the agent’s reported value wi 6 psi(a,d,v−i) and at price
psi(a,d,v−i).
5Note that we cannot go beyond Model A3, because of a recent
result of Lavi and Nisan [15] mentioned in the introduction.THEOREM 23. (Model A1) The following are equivalent state-
ments in a domain with no early arrival and no late departure:
1. An allocation rule has a truthful implementation.
2. An allocation rule is monotonic.
3. An allocation rule is supported by a monotonic and value-
independent price schedule psi(a,d,v−i).
THEOREM 24. (Model A2) The following are equivalent state-
ments in a domain with no early arrivals:
1. An allocation rule has a truthful implementation.
2. An allocation rule is monotonic, and when making an alloca-
tion assigns the item in the critical period.
3. An allocation rule is supported by a monotonic and value-
independent price schedule psi(a,d,v−i), and when making
an allocation assigns the item no earlier than the ﬁrst period
t : ai 6 t 6 di for which psi(ai,t,v−i) is minimal.
THEOREM 25. (Model A3) The following are equivalent state-
ments in a domain with no late departures:
1. An allocation rule has a truthful implementation.
2. An allocation rule is monotonic, and when making an alloca-
tion assigns the item in the critical period.
3. An allocation rule is supported by a monotonic and value-
independent price schedule psi(a,d,v−i), and when making
an allocation assigns the item no later than the last period
t : ai 6 t 6 di for which psi(t,di,v−i) is minimal.
Ineachcase, thepaymentrulethatmakestheallocationruletruth-
ful is as deﬁned in Eq. 7 in Section 3.1.
Theprice-basedcharacterizationsprovideausefulcomplementto
the monotonicity-based characterization on allocation rules. Rather
than deﬁne monotonic allocation rules, one can deﬁne monotonic
and value-independent price schedules for which the supported al-
location rule is feasible.
9. OPEN PROBLEMS
In this paper, we considered online auctions with re-usable goods.
We presented several upper and lower bounds on competitiveness
for both revenue and efﬁciency of truthful online mechanisms. In a
general framework, we also provided necessary and sufﬁcient char-
acterizations for allocation rules that can be implemented in a truth-
ful online auction. Here, we present several open problems.
The main open question is to determine whether the known lower
bounds for deterministic mechanisms can be extended to apply to
randomized mechanisms. We are referring here to our Theorem 10
(for efﬁciency) and Theorem 12 (for revenue), as well as the lower
bound by Lavi and Nisan [15] (for efﬁciency, in misreporting model
A2). We also conjecture that the lower bound of Theorem 12 can be
improved to Ω(logh) and extended to asymmetric mechanisms.
Another open problem is to determine whether there is a deter-
ministic mechanism whose revenue is O(logh)-competitive with
the VCG mechanism, at least in the case where the interval [1,h] is
known to the mechanism. (The paper by Lavi and Nisan [14], which
addresses a different type of online auction problem, achieves this
bound using a deterministic mechanism with known bid interval.)
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